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Abstract 
We characterize the optimal pollution-, capital- and labour-tax structure 
in a continuous-time model in the presence of pollution (resulting from 
production), both in the first- and second-best, allowing investors to be 
driven by social responsibility objectives. The social responsibility objective 
takes the form of warm-glow, as in Andreoni (1990) and Dam (2011), 
inducing firms to reduce pollution through increased abatement activity. 
Among the results, the second-best pollution tax displays an additivity 
property and the Chamley-Judd zero capital-income tax can be violated 
under warm-glow preferences. We also show that first- and second-best 
pollution taxes are positive, under warm-glow preferences, and, under mild 
assumptions, the latter yield lower first-best pollution taxes and lower 
pollution intensity. 
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1. Introduction 
In the present paper we ask how optimal pollution taxes, as well as capital and labour 
taxes are affected by socially responsible objectives of investors, both in the first- and second-
best. More precisely, to the extent to which socially responsible investors manage to induce 
firms to reduce pollution, what is then the structure of optimal taxes and, in particular, pollution 
taxes? 
The issue of environmental quality has been increasingly debated in the last decades. 
Many international summits (from Kyoto in 1997 to Paris 2015), the diffusion of credit rating 
agencies, shareholder activism, mobilization of NGOs and social media prove this growth of 
environmental concerns (Ballestrero et al. 2015). Socially responsible investment (SRI) has 
been argued to be a possible instrument to improve environmental quality through a market 
mechanism.  
According to Eurosif, SRI “is a long-term oriented investment approach, which 
integrates ESG [i.e. Environmental, Social, Governance] factors in the research, analysis and 
selection process of securities within an investment portfolio. It combines fundamental 
analysis and engagement with an evaluation of ESG factors in order to better capture long term 
returns for investors, and to benefit society by influencing the behaviour of companies.” 
(Eurosif 2016, p. 9). Hence, SRI is a process of identifying and investing in companies that meet 
certain standards of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 1  through such activities and 
strategies as positive or negative screening, shareholder advocacy, impact and community 
investing (for more details see GSIA, 2016).  
As a matter of fact, according to the latest Global Sustainable Investment Alliance report 
(GSIA, 2016) global SRI assets amounted to $22.89 trillion at the start of 2016 (an increase of 
                                                        
1 For a recent review of economic literature on CSR, see Brekke and Pekovic (2018). 
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25% since 2014), and represented 26% of total assets managed in the world, with $8.72 trillion 
in total assets managed in the US (10% in 2001), $12.04 trillion in Europe, $6.7 billion in 
Canada, $515.7 billion in Australia and New Zealand, $52.1 billion in Asia.  
In light of this recent trend and for its wide potential implications concerning, for 
example, the design of pollution abatement policies and of fiscal incentives for green 
initiatives 2 , several scholars have started analysing the phenomenon from an economic 
perspective. However, while the literature on pollution taxes has been flourishing 3 , the 
economic literature on SRI and on its consequences on taxation is still embryonic and results 
are mixed. 
As for the existing economic literature on SRI4, Hainkel et al. (2001), in a one-period 
model, show that negative screening on polluting firms by fund managers can induce these 
firms to adopt cleaner technologies, in that otherwise they would incur higher costs of capital. 
The positive effects of financial markets are also stressed by Dam (2011), who argues that SRI 
creates a role for the stock market to deal with intergenerational environmental externalities, 
consisting in the fact that short-lived individuals fail to account for the long-term effects of 
pollution. The author shows that, although socially responsible investors are short-lived, the 
                                                        
2 For example, in 1995 the Dutch government has launched the Green Funds Scheme, a tax incentive scheme for 
investors into green initiatives. In the U.S. there are examples of tax-credit bonds, (bond investors receive tax 
credits instead of interest payments so issuers do not have to pay interest on their green bond issuances) or tax-
exempt bonds. More in general, developed countries have committed under the international negotiations to 
mobilising USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries 
(see OECD 2015). However, how to count and track climate finance is still an open question. 
3 The seminal work is Sandmo (1975). See also Cremer et al. (2001) and the survey by Bovenberg and Goulder 
(2002). More recent works on this subject are Bontems and Bourgeon (2005), Goulder and Parry (2008), Gahvari 
(2014), Jacobs and De Mooij (2015), Kampas and Horan (2016), Belfiori (2018), Aronsson and Sjögren, (2018).  
4 For a survey on the topic, see Renneboog et al. (2008). 
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forward-looking nature of stock prices, reflecting the warm-glow motive, can help to mitigate 
the conflict between current and future generations. 
Dam and Scholtens (2015) develop a model that links SRI and CSR, showing that 
responsible firms have higher returns on assets, although the overall effect on stock market 
returns depends on the relative strength of supply and demand side effects. On the other hand, 
Barnea et al. (2005) argue that negative screening reduces the incentives of polluting firms to 
invest, but also the total level of investment in the economy. Dam and Heijdra (2011) analyse 
the effects of SRI and public abatement on environmental quality in a growth model where 
investors feel partly responsible for environmental pollution when holding firm equity (due to 
a warm-glow mechanism as in Andreoni 1990). In this scenario, the authors show that SRI 
behaviour by households partially offsets the positive effects on environmental quality of public 
abatement policies. 
Finally, according to Vanwalleghem (2017), SRI may have a mixed effect on firms’ 
incentives to remove negative externalities. Whereas SRI screening incentivizes the removal of 
externalities (as predicted by Heinkel et al. 2001 and confirmed by the empirical work of Hong 
and Kacperczyk 2009), SRI trading can disincentivise it when traders disagree on the 
externality removal’s cash flow effects.5 
While providing interesting results, the above-mentioned literature has not analysed the 
optimal structure of taxes in presence of both socially responsible investors and firms. 
Hence, in this paper we specify a continuous-time model, where pollution is a by-
product of production, but firms can engage in abatement, reducing net pollution. We model 
investors’ social-responsibility objective through a warm-glow mechanism as in Andreoni 
                                                        
5 Other works focusing on socially responsible firms and financial markets are Graff Zivin and Small (2005) and 
Baron (2007). However, these are partial-equilibrium and static models, in which social responsibility is 
concerned with charitable giving and not with abatement of externalities or public bads.  
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(1990) and Dam (2011). Through investors’ portfolio choice, firms are induced to engage in 
socially responsible activities (abatement). By allowing for different specifications of the warm-
glow function6, we show the circumstances under which the well-established zero capital-
income tax result, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) can be violated. 
In this paper we show that pollution tax is positive for any specification of the warm-glow 
and, in the second-best, displays an additive property. 
Taxes on production-factor incomes, in the first-best, are either zero or negative (negative 
taxation arising in case the perceived pollution content of firms is negatively related to the total 
scale of economic activity). Hence, in the latter case a violation of the zero-capital income tax 
result occurs. Finally, for illustrative purposes we provide an example with specific utility 
function, to show that that the presence of warm-glow implies lower pollution taxes, lower 
pollution intensity and lower installed capital in comparison to an economy without warm-
glow preferences. 
                                                        
6 While there is increasing evidence of the very existence of warm-glow preferences (see Andreoni et al. 2017), 
the exact shape is far from being clear. Although some recent works have produced axiomatizations of the warm 
glow that can help to characterize its shape (see Evren and Minardi 2017 and the literature therein), we believe 
that the argument of Bernehim and Rangel (2005) is still valid, as they write: “Unfortunately, in the context of 
warm glow giving and public goods, these processes are not yet well understood. The warm glow model remains 
a “black box”, and one can interpret it as a reduced form for a variety of mechanisms with starkly differing welfare 
implications” (p. 63). Moreover, Diamond (2006), while recognizing that warm glow may improve our description 
of how individuals behave, argues for ignoring the effects of warm–glow utility on social welfare when considering 
optimal tax structures. The reason being that warm glow amounts to preferences over how the public good is 
produced (see also Andreoni 2006). In the light of these issues, in this paper we undertake the following choices: 
given that in our model the presence of warm-glow has testable implications, in that it produces an extra-cost of 
capital to polluting firms that could be empirically estimated, we analyse optimal taxes under different 
specifications of the warm-glow, leaving the choice of the exact shape to future research. Second, following Allgood 
(2009), in the last section we also provide results for the case in which the warm-glow is set arbitrarily close to 
zero. 
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The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we specify the model and characterize the 
decentralized equilibrium; in section 3 we present the Ramsey problem of optimal taxation and 
provide the solutions; in section 4 we discuss the results and in section 5 we illustrate the role 
of the warm-glow in affecting the first-best pollution tax. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model setup 
In this section, we specify the benchmark model. The model contains H identical 
households and J identical firms. We assume that an infinitely lived consumer-investor in each 
period is endowed with a unit of time that can be allocated either to leisure or to work. 
Moreover, individuals are endowed with an instantaneous utility function 
𝑢(𝑐(𝑡), 𝑙(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑄(𝑡)), where 𝑐(𝑡), is consumption for that individual at period t, 𝑙(𝑡) is labour 
supply, 𝑝(𝑡) is an index of the responsibility that the individual feels for the pollution caused by 
firms that it holds shares in (warm-glow) and 𝑄(𝑡), is the environmental quality. This utility is 
assumed to be increasing in 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑄(𝑡), decreasing in 𝑙(𝑡) and 𝑝(𝑡) and strictly concave. 
Hence, in each period an individual chooses consumption, labour supply and saving allocation. 
As for firms, we assume perfectly competitive markets and constant return to scale 
technology. As a consequence, we can retain the “standard” second-best framework, in the 
sense that there are no rents. 
Finally, we assume the government finances an exogenous stream of per-capita 
expenditure g by issuing debt (which is the only clean asset in the market) and levying taxes. 
To retain the second-best, we levy taxes on the choices made by the families, i.e. savings, labour 
supply and by firms (pollution). Consequently, we introduce a capital-income tax, a labour 
income tax and a tax on pollution. 
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2.1. Households 
The lifetime utility function of an individual household, at period 0, is: 
 
𝑈(0) = ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡
∞
0
𝑢(𝑐(𝑡), 𝑙(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑄(𝑡))𝑑𝑡       (1) 
 
with 𝑢𝑐 , 𝑢𝑄 > 0, 𝑢𝑙 , 𝑢𝑝 < 0, 𝑢𝑐𝑐, 𝑢𝑙𝑙 , 𝑢𝑝𝑝, 𝑢𝑄𝑄 < 0  and 𝜌 > 0  the intertemporal discount rate.  
Population size, H, is assumed to be constant. Individual household takes the path of Q as given. 
In line with Dam and Scholtens (2015), the warm-glow 𝑝(𝑡) is assumed to be a function of the 
individual’s portfolio invested in polluting firms: 
 
𝑝(𝑡) ≡ ∑
𝑒𝑗(𝑡)
?̅?𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 ?̅?
𝑗(𝑡)          (2) 
 
where 𝑒𝑗(𝑡) is the number of shares of firm j owned by the individual, ?̅?𝑗  is number of total 
shares of firm j, assumed to be constant, ?̅?𝑗(𝑡) is the “pollution content” of firm j as perceived 
by the individual. The idea is that the household feels responsible for the pollution associated 
with its share ownership, even though the pollution is not directly felt. We allow the latter to 
be a function of other potentially relevant variables: 
 
?̅?𝑗(𝑡) ≡ ?̅?(𝑥𝑗(𝑡); 𝑋(𝑡), 𝐹(𝑡), 𝑄(𝑡))        (3)  
 
where 𝑥𝑗(𝑡) is the flow of pollution produced by the jth firm, 𝑋(𝑡) ≡ ∑ 𝑥𝑗(𝑡)𝐽𝑗=1  the aggregate 
flow of pollution, 𝐹(𝑡) is the aggregate gross production of the homogenous good. We assume 
that ?̅?𝑗  is linear in 𝑥𝑗  (as any non-linearity can be captured by 𝑢). Notice that 𝑥𝑗(𝑡) is controlled 
by the firm j, i.e. each firm can affect its “rating” through its decision, while aggregate variables 
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are taken as given by each firm.  While our analysis and results are quite general, in order to 
better characterize their economic content, we can focus on some specifications of the 
perceived pollution content function ?̅?𝑗(𝑡): 
 
Assumption H1: The warm-glow perceived pollution content function ?̅?𝑗(𝑡) assumes one of the 
following forms: 
 
?̅?𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙ 𝑥𝑗(𝑡)          (S.1) 
 
?̅?𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝑄(𝑡)
          (S.2) 
 
?̅?𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝐹(𝑡)
           (S.3) 
 
?̅?𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝑋(𝑡)
          (S.4) 
 
with 𝛾 > 0 . The first and the second specification for ?̅?𝑗(𝑡)  are in line with the existing 
literature (Dam 2011 and Dam and Heijdra 2011), while the others, to the best of our 
knowledge, are new and are meant to represent a situation in which the pollution content of 
firms, as perceived by the individual for warm-glow purposes, is relative to either aggregate 
economic activity (gross GDP) ( ?̅?𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝐹(𝑡)
),  or aggregate total pollution  (?̅?𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝑋(𝑡)
).  
In particular, Assumption S.3 can be interpreted by stating that, ceteris paribus (i.e. for a 
given flow of pollution produced by owned firms), the bigger the economy’s scale or dimension 
(proxied by total GDP), the lower the pain the individual will suffer from (indirectly) being 
responsible for producing that amount of pollution. Put it differently, a given flow of pollution 
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will produce a different perceived damage to the individual and the latter perceived damage 
will be higher the smaller the economy is: the individual feels less responsible for generating a 
certain pollution flow the higher the level of GDP generated by those polluting firms.7  
 At each instant of time t, individual’s wealth is  
 
𝑎(𝑡) ≡ 𝑏(𝑡) + ∑ 𝑒𝑗(𝑡)𝐽𝑗=1 𝑃𝑒
𝑗(𝑡)         (4) 
 
where 𝑏(𝑡)  is per-capita public debt, 𝑃𝑒
𝑗(𝑡)  the stock market price of shares. By defining 
𝜔𝑗(𝑡) ≡
𝑒𝑗(𝑡)𝑃𝑒
𝑗(𝑡)
𝑎(𝑡)
 as the portfolio share invested in firm j, and 𝑉𝑗(𝑡) ≡ ?̅?𝑗𝑃𝑒
𝑗(𝑡)  as the stock 
market value of firm j, we have: 
 
𝑝(𝑡) ≡ ∑
𝜔𝑗(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡)
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1 ?̅?
𝑗(𝑡)         (5) 
 
and the individual budget constraint reads as8: 
 
?̇?(𝑡) = ∑ 𝜔𝑗(𝑡)?̅?𝑒
𝑗(𝑡)𝐽𝑗=1 𝑎(𝑡) + [1 − ∑ 𝜔
𝑗(𝑡)𝐽𝑗=1 ]?̅?(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡) + ?̅?(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡) − 𝑐(𝑡) − 𝑧(𝑡) (6) 
 
                                                        
7 As already mentioned in footnote 6, we decided to analyse different specifications of the warm-glow preferences, 
given that there is little or no empirical evidence on the exact shape of the warm-glow function. A recent empirical 
work on this issue is Carpenter (2018) (see also the empirical literature mentioned therein). However, the latter 
studies focus on the warm-glow concerning private donation to a public good, and do not consider the issue of 
environmental externalities and capital markets, as in our case. In any case, we follow their suggestion to assume 
the warm-glow as a concave function (in fact, after equation (1) we assume that 𝑢𝑝 < 0 and 𝑢𝑝𝑝 < 0). Finally, 
linearity of ?̅?(∙) in 𝑥𝑗(∙), besides being in line with the existing literature, allows also for aggregation. See also our 
comments after eq. (30). 
8 We follow Merton (1971). 
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where ?̅?𝑒
𝑗 ≡ 𝑟𝑒
𝑗(1 − 𝜏𝑎(𝑡)) is net-of-tax return on share j, ?̅?(𝑡) ≡ 𝑟(𝑡)(1 − 𝜏𝑎(𝑡)) is net-of-tax 
interest rate on public debt, ?̅?(𝑡) ≡ 𝑤(𝑡)(1 − 𝜏𝑙(𝑡)) is the net-of-tax wage, 𝑧(𝑡) a lump sum tax 
(which we will set to zero in the second-best analysis) and 𝜏𝑎(𝑡), 𝜏𝑙(𝑡) are the tax rates on 
capital income and labour income, respectively. Returns on shares of firm j are: 
 
 𝑟𝑒
𝑗(𝑡) ≡
?̇?𝑗(𝑡)
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
𝑒𝑗(𝑡) +
𝑑𝑗(𝑡)
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
         (7) 
 
where 
𝑑𝑗(𝑡)
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
 is the dividend pay-out ratio and 𝑑𝑗(𝑡) total dividend payments by firm j.  
The individual’s problem is to maximize (1) w.r.t. 𝑐(𝑡), 𝑙(𝑡), 𝜔𝑗(𝑡) subject to (4) and (6). 
The associated current value Hamiltonian is: 
 
Λ(𝑡) = 𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑞(𝑡)?̇?(𝑡)          (8) 
 
with 𝑞(𝑡) the shadow price of wealth. FOCs yield: 
 
𝑢𝑐(𝑡) − 𝑞(𝑡) = 0           (9) 
 
𝑢𝑙(𝑡) + 𝑞(𝑡)?̅?(𝑡) = 0                      (10) 
 
𝑢𝑝(𝑡)
?̅?𝑗(𝑡)
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
𝑎(𝑡) + 𝑞(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡)[1 − 𝜏𝑎(𝑡)][𝑟𝑒
𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑟(𝑡)] = 0                (11) 
 
𝑞(𝑡)[[1 − 𝜏𝑎(𝑡)][∑ 𝜔𝑗(𝑡)𝑟𝑒
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 + (1 − ∑ 𝜔
𝑗(𝑡)𝐽𝑗=1 )𝑟(𝑡)] + 𝑢𝑝(𝑡) ∑
𝜔𝑗(𝑡)?̅?𝑗(𝑡)
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1 = 𝜌𝑞(𝑡) − ?̇?(𝑡)   
                        (12) 
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Note that eq. (9) and eq. (11) provide: 
 
−
𝑢𝑝(𝑡)
𝑢𝑐(𝑡)
?̅?𝑗(𝑡) = [1 − 𝜏𝑎(𝑡)]𝑉𝑗(𝑡)[𝑟𝑒
𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑟(𝑡)]                  (13) 
 
Equations (9)-(10) provide the usual optimality conditions for consumption and labour supply; 
eq. (13) is the no-arbitrage condition for shares and bonds. Intuitively, since 𝑢𝑝 < 0, 𝑢𝑐 > 0 and 
?̅?(∙) > 0, the equation states that the individual investor demands a higher rate of return on 
shares than on clean bonds, because the former produces an undesirable side effect in the form 
of perceived pollution: in fact, the left hand side measures the marginal willingness to pay for 
avoiding the responsibility of owning shares in a polluting firm times the (perceived) pollution-
content of the firm, while the right hand side is the marginal post-tax benefit of owning shares 
in the same firm measured as the excess return compared to government bonds. Notice that 
the return on assets in production is greater than the return on government bonds and the 
difference is proportional to the pollution content by the firm, thus there is a pollution 
premium, a compensation required by the household for holding “dirty assets”. Exploiting (7), 
(13) becomes: 
 
𝑢𝑝(𝑡)
𝑢𝑐(𝑡)
?̅?𝑗(𝑡)
[1−𝜏𝑎(𝑡)]
+ ?̇?
𝑗
(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑟(𝑡)𝑉𝑗(𝑡) = 0                  (14) 
 
Finally, pre-multiplying (11) by 𝜔𝑗(𝑡) and summing from j=1 to J and using (12) we have: 
 
𝑞(𝑡)[1 − 𝜏𝑎(𝑡)]𝑟(𝑡) = 𝜌𝑞(𝑡) − ?̇?(𝑡).                   (15) 
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2.2. Firms 
We assume that each firm runs its business in a perfectly competitive market, endowed 
with constant-returns-to-scale production technology that uses capital and labour inputs to 
produce a homogenous good. We shall also assume that each firm’s technologies are the same. 
Hence, it will be possible to aggregate the firms to obtain a representative firm. The production 
function for firm j is: 
 
𝑦𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑗(𝑘𝑗(𝑡), 𝑙𝑗(𝑡))                     (16) 
 
with 𝑘𝑗(𝑡)  physical capital input and 𝑙𝑗(𝑡)  labour input, respectively. We follow Brock and 
Taylor (2005) by assuming that, at any time t, every unit of output generates 𝜀 units of pollution 
as a joint product of output and that pollution can be reduced by abatement activity by the firm, 
𝛼(𝑡). The latter is supposed to be carried out through a CRS technology that is an increasing 
function of the total scale of firm activity 𝑓(𝑡) and of the firm’s efforts at abatement, 𝑓𝛼(𝑡). If 
abatement at level 𝛼(𝑡)  removes 𝜀 ∙ 𝛼(𝑡)  units of pollution, we have that total emissions 
(pollution) 𝑥(𝑡) by firm j is equal to: 
 
𝑥𝑗(𝑡) = 𝜀 ∙ 𝑓𝑗(𝑡) − 𝜀 ∙ 𝛼(𝑓𝑗(𝑡), 𝑓𝛼𝑗(𝑡))                  (17) 
 
Defining ψ𝑗(𝑡) ≡
𝑓𝛼
𝑗
(𝑡)
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
 as the fraction of output devoted to abatement activity and exploiting 
CRS, we get: 
 
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
= 𝜀 ∙ [1 − 𝛼(1, ψ𝑗(𝑡))] = 𝜀 ∙ [1 − 𝛼(ψ𝑗(𝑡))]                 (18) 
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with 𝛼 increasing in ψ𝑗  and, thus, eq. (18) gives ψ𝑗(𝑡) = Ψ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
) 9, with Ψ′ < 0, Ψ′′ > 0. Gross 
operating profits of the firms are: 
 
π𝑗(𝑡) ≡ [1 − Ψ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
)] 𝑓𝑗(𝑘𝑗(𝑡), 𝑙𝑗(𝑡)) − 𝑤(𝑡)𝑙𝑗(𝑡) − 𝜏𝑥(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡)               (19) 
 
where 𝜏𝑥(𝑡) is the tax on pollution at time t. Given that we assume that the number of shares 
remains constant and that we abstract from corporate bonds10, new investments, 𝑖𝑗(𝑡), can only 
by financed via retained earnings, 𝑅𝑒(𝑡), i.e. π𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑅𝑒𝑗(𝑡). That is, by exploiting the 
capital accumulation identity: 
 
?̇?𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑖𝑗(𝑡) − 𝛿𝑘𝑗(𝑡)                     (20) 
 
with 𝛿 the (constant) instantaneous depreciation rate, we get: 
 
?̇?𝑗(𝑡) = π𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑑𝑗(𝑡) − 𝛿𝑘𝑗(𝑡)                    (21) 
 
and, exploiting (19), (21) becomes: 
 
?̇?𝑗(𝑡) = [1 − Ψ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
)] 𝑓𝑗(𝑘𝑗(𝑡), 𝑙𝑗(𝑡)) − 𝑤(𝑡)𝑙𝑗(𝑡) − 𝜏𝑥(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑑𝑗(𝑡) − 𝛿𝑘𝑗(𝑡)          (22) 
 
                                                        
9 From (18), 𝛼(ψ𝑗(𝑡)) = 1 −
1
𝜀
∙
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
 gives ψ𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛼−1 (1 −
1
𝜀
∙
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
) ≡ Ψ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
). 
10 Corporate bonds would be equivalent to shares in our model, as they would also carry the same pollution 
premium as shares. 
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Now, integrating (14) we get: 
 
 𝑉𝑗(0) = ∫ 𝑒− ∫ 𝑟(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0 [𝑑𝑗(𝑡) +
𝑢𝑝(𝑡)
𝑢𝑐(𝑡)
?̅?𝑗(𝑡)
[1−𝜏𝑎(𝑡)]
]
∞
0
𝑑𝑡                 (23) 
 
which provides the value of the firm at time 0. Substituting for 𝑑𝑗(𝑡) from (22), (23) reads as: 
 
𝑉𝑗(0) = ∫ 𝑒− ∫ 𝑟(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
∞
0
{[1 − Ψ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
)] 𝑓𝑗(𝑘𝑗(𝑡), 𝑙𝑗(𝑡)) − 𝑤(𝑡)𝑙𝑗(𝑡) − 𝜏𝑥(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) − 𝛿𝑘𝑗(𝑡) +
𝑢𝑝(𝑡)
𝑢𝑐(𝑡)
?̅?𝑗(𝑡)
[1−𝜏𝑎(𝑡)]
− ?̇?𝑗(𝑡)} 𝑑𝑡
                        (24) 
Given the assumption of perfect competition, the firm hires labour, 𝑙𝑗(𝑡), on the spot market 
and remunerates it according to its marginal productivity. In fact, FOCs on (24) w.r.t. 𝑙𝑗(𝑡) and 
𝑥𝑗(𝑡) yield, respectively: 
 
[1 − Ψ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
) + Ψ′ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
)
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
] 𝑓𝑙
𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑤(𝑡) = 0                  (25) 
 
𝑢𝑝(𝑡)
𝑢𝑐(𝑡)
1
[1−𝜏𝑎(𝑡)]
𝜕?̅?𝑗(𝑡)
𝜕𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
− Ψ′ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
) − 𝜏𝑥(𝑡) = 0                  (26) 
 
The optimality condition for 𝑘𝑗(𝑡), 
𝑑𝑉𝑗(0)
𝑑𝑘𝑗(𝑡)
=
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑉𝑗(0)
𝑑?̇?𝑗(𝑡)
, classical calculus of variation, gives: 
 
∫ 𝑒− ∫ 𝑟(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
∞
0
{[1 − Ψ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
) + Ψ′ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
)
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
] 𝑓𝑘
𝑗(𝑡) − 𝛿} 𝑑𝑡 =
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
∫ 𝑒− ∫ 𝑟(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 ⇒  
 
[1 − Ψ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
) + Ψ′ (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
)
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
] 𝑓𝑘
𝑗(𝑡) − 𝛿 = 𝑟(𝑡)                   (27) 
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Finally, it can be shown that, by plugging (25)-(27) into (24) and exploiting CRS in 𝑓𝑗(𝑡), then 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑉𝑗(0) ≡ ?̅?𝑗𝑃𝑒
𝑗(0) = 𝑘𝑗(0). 
 
3. The Ramsey problem 
We now solve the optimal tax problem (Ramsey problem). In doing so, we adopt the primal 
approach, consisting of the maximization of a direct social welfare function through the choice 
of quantities (i.e. allocations; see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1972). For this purpose, we must restrict 
the set of allocations among which the government can choose to those that can be 
decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. We now provide the constraints that must be 
imposed on the government’s problem in order to comply with this requirement. 
In our framework there is an implementability constraint associated with the individual’s 
intertemporal choice plan. More precisely this constraint is the individual budget constraint 
with prices substituted for by using the individual’s first order conditions, which yields (see 
Appendix A.1): 
 
 𝑎(0)𝑞(0) = ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡[𝑢𝑝(𝑡)𝑝(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑙(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑐(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑧(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡
∞
0
             (28) 
 
Finally, there are two feasibility constraints, one requires that, under the assumption that firms 
are equal, private and public consumption plus investment be equal to aggregate output, i.e.11 
 
?̇?(𝑡) = [1 − Ψ (
𝑋(𝑡)
𝐹(𝑡)
)] 𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡)) − 𝑐(𝑡)𝐻 − 𝛿𝐾(𝑡) − 𝐺(𝑡).                (29) 
                                                        
11 In fact, aggregating over firms we get: 
 ∑ [1 − Ψ𝑗 (
𝑥𝑗(𝑡
𝑓𝑗(𝑡)
)] 𝑓𝑗(𝑘𝑗(𝑡), 𝑙𝑗(𝑡))𝐽𝑗=1 = ∑ [1 − Ψ (
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑓(𝑡)
)] 𝑓(𝑘(𝑡), 𝑙(𝑡))𝐽𝑗=1 = [1 − Ψ (
𝑋(𝑡)
𝐹(𝑡)
)] 𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡)),  
with 𝐿(𝑡) = 𝑙(𝑡)𝐻. 
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with 𝐿(𝑡) = 𝑙(𝑡)𝐻. The other one is given by the dynamics of environmental quality, which we 
assume, as in Dam and Heijdra (2011): 
 
?̇?(𝑡) = −𝜇𝑄(𝑡) − 𝜂𝑋(𝑡) + 𝜙                     (30) 
 
This formulation captures the idea that there is a natural level of environmental quality, which 
the environment converges to in absence of pollution, 
𝜙
𝜇
. Moreover, from (30) 𝑋(𝑡)  can be 
thought of as the negative of decentralized provision of additions to a public good 𝑄(𝑡) (as in 
Besley and Gathak 2007). 
Notice that in equilibrium 𝜔𝑗(𝑡) ≡
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
𝐻∙𝑎(𝑡)
; then, by (4): 
 
 𝑝(𝑡) ≡ ∑
𝜔𝑗(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡)
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1 ?̅?
𝑗(𝑡) = ∑
?̅?𝑗(𝑥𝑗(𝑡);𝐹(𝑡),𝑋(𝑡),𝑄(𝑡))
𝐻
=
?̅?(𝑋(𝑡);𝐹(𝑡),𝑋(𝑡),𝑄(𝑡))
𝐻
𝐽
𝑗=1  
 
where the last equality follows from ?̅?𝑗(𝑡) being linear in 𝑥𝑗(𝑡). Hence, at the equilibrium: 
 
?̅?(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙ 𝑋(𝑡)  in specification (S.1) 
 ?̅?(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙
𝑋(𝑡)
𝑄(𝑡)
  in specification (S.2) 
?̅?(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙
𝑋(𝑡)
𝐹(𝑡)
  in specification (S.3) 
?̅?(𝑡) = 𝛾   in specification (S.4) 
 
Suppose that the tax programme is chosen in period 0, so the problem of the policymaker is to 
maximize (1) subject to eq. (28) and, ∀t ≥ 0, (29) and (30). The current value Hamiltonian is: 
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Λ(𝑡) = 𝐻𝑢 (𝑐(𝑡), 𝑙(𝑡),
?̅?(𝑡)
𝐻
, 𝑄(𝑡)) + 𝜆𝐻[𝑢𝑝(𝑡)𝑝(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑙(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑐(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑧(𝑡)] +
𝑞𝑘(𝑡) {[1 − Ψ (
𝑋(𝑡)
𝐹(𝑡)
)] 𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝑙(𝑡)𝐻) − 𝑐(𝑡)𝐻 − 𝛿𝐾(𝑡) − 𝐺(𝑡)} + 𝑞𝑄(𝑡){−𝜇𝑄(𝑡) − 𝜂𝑋(𝑡) + 𝜙 } 
                        (31) 
where 𝜆 is the multiplier associated with the implementability constraint and 𝑞𝑘(𝑡) and 𝑞𝑄(𝑡) 
are the co-states associated with the other constraints and where we have made use of the 
equilibrium condition 𝐿(𝑡) = 𝑙(𝑡)𝐻. 
Preliminarily, notice that, by eq. (3), we allow the warm-glow to be a function of other 
variables, say 𝑆𝑖 , so that the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to any such 
variable will be (omitting time subscripts): 
 
 
𝑑Λ
𝑑𝑆𝑖
=
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝑆𝑖
+
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑆𝑖
,  
 
with 
 
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝑝
= 𝐻𝑢𝑝(1 + 𝜆∆𝑝)                      (32) 
 
and ∆𝑝≡ 1 +
 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑢𝑝
+
 𝑢𝑙𝑝𝑙
𝑢𝑝
+
 𝑢𝑐𝑝𝑐
𝑢𝑝
, referred to as the “general equilibrium elasticity” of the warm-
glow. The first order conditions of the Ramsey problem are (omitting time subscripts): 
 
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝑐
= 0 ⟹ 𝑢𝑐(1 + 𝜆∆𝑐) = 𝑞
𝑘                    (33) 
 
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝑙
= 0 ⟹ 𝑢𝑝(1 + 𝜆∆𝑝)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐿 + 𝑢𝑙(1 + 𝜆∆𝑙) + 𝑞
𝑘 [1 − Ψ (
𝑋
𝐹
) + Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
)
𝑋
𝐹
] 𝐹𝐿 = 0              (34) 
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𝜕Λ
𝜕𝐾
: 𝑢𝑝(1 + 𝜆∆𝑝)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾 + 𝑞
𝑘 {[1 − Ψ (
𝑋
𝐹
) + Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
)
𝑋
𝐹
] 𝐹𝐾 − 𝛿} = 𝜌𝑞
𝑘 − ?̇?𝑘               (35) 
 
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝑋
= 0 ⟹ 𝑢𝑝(1 + 𝜆∆𝑝)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
− 𝑞𝑘Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
) − 𝜂𝑞𝑄 = 0                  (36) 
 
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝑄
: 𝑢𝑝(1 + 𝜆∆𝑝)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑄
+ 𝐻𝑢𝑄(1 + 𝜆∆𝑄) = (𝜌 + 𝜇)𝑞
𝑄 − ?̇?Q                (37) 
 
with ∆𝑐≡ 1 +
 𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
+
 𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑙
𝑢𝑐
+
 𝑢𝑝𝑐𝑝
𝑢𝑐
, ∆𝑙≡ 1 +
 𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑢𝑙
+
 𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑙
+
 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑝
𝑢𝑙
, usually referred to as the “general 
equilibrium elasticities” of consumption and labour, respectively and ∆𝑄≡
 𝑢𝑝𝑄𝑝
𝑢𝑄
+
 𝑢𝑙𝑄𝑙
𝑢𝑄
+
 𝑢𝑐𝑄𝑐
𝑢𝑄
. 
By dividing (34) by (33), exploiting (25) (recognizing that 𝑓𝑙
𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐹𝐿 ) and the equilibrium 
condition stemming from (9) and (10) (i.e. 𝑢𝑐?̅? = −𝑢𝑙) we get: 
 
𝜏𝑙
1−𝜏𝑙
=
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑙
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐿 + 𝜆
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑙
(∆𝑝−∆𝑐)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐿 + 𝜆
(∆𝑙−∆𝑐)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
                  (38) 
 
which provides the implicit expression for the labour-income tax.  
As for the capital income tax, plugging (27) into (35) (recognizing that 𝑓𝑘
𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐹𝐾) and dividing 
by (33) we get: 
 
?̇?𝑘
𝑞𝑘
= −
𝑢𝑝(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
𝑢𝑐(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾 + 𝜌 − 𝑟                    (38’) 
 
Next, plugging (9) into (33), time-differentiating and exploiting (15) we obtain 
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?̇?𝑘
𝑞𝑘
=
?̇?
𝑞
+ 𝜆
∆̇𝑐
1+𝜆∆𝑐
= 𝜌 − [1 − 𝜏𝑎]𝑟 + 𝜆
∆̇𝑐
1+𝜆∆𝑐
               (38’’) 
 
Equating (38’) and (38’’) and simplifying yields: 
 
𝜏𝑎 = −
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝑟
+
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜆
(∆𝑐−∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝑟
−
𝜆
𝑟
∆̇𝑐
1+𝜆∆𝑐
                 (39) 
 
Preliminarily, notice that if the implementability constraint does not bind, then its associated 
multiplier 𝜆  is equal to zero. This means that, given that only the resource constraints are 
binding, the government is able to implement the first best allocation, thus correcting for the 
presence of market failures (the usual conditions for Pareto optimality apply). On the other 
hand, if the implementability constraint binds, then 𝜆 is different from zero and the Lipsey-
Lancaster (1956) second-best theorem applies. In particular, we assume that this case occurs 
because the Government cannot raise the amount of (per capita) lump-sum taxes that are 
needed to implement the first best allocation (say, 𝑧∗), but only the amount 𝑧̅ (with 0 ≤ 𝑧̅ < 𝑧∗). 
Given the second-best suboptimality of this situation, the first derivative of the current value 
Hamiltonian with respect to 𝑧, evaluated at the upper bound 𝑧̅, must be positive. From (31), 
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝑧
|
𝑧=?̅?
= 𝜆𝐻𝑢𝑐 > 0 only if 𝜆 > 0. For this reason, 𝜆 is usually interpreted as a measure of the 
deadweight loss brought about by distortionary taxation.12 
As for the capital income tax, eq. (39) shows that, at the steady state (i.e. when all per-capita 
variables are constant and hence ∆̇𝑐= 0), it is different from zero only if 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
≠ 0, both in the first 
and second best (i.e. when 𝜆 = 0 and 𝜆 > 0, respectively). The reason is that, in this case, the 
                                                        
12 For the sake of simplicity, we will set 𝑧̅ = 0 in the analysis that follows. 
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government finds it optimal to hit (or subsidize) capital income to correct for the externality 
that the capital stock exerts on the individual’s warm-glow via total output (i.e. assumption S.3). 
Along the transition path, on the other hand, capital income tax can be different from zero even 
if 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
≠ 0, provided that ∆̇𝑐≠ 0: if the general elasticity of consumption decreases (increases), 
future consumption becomes less (more) elastic and then it is second-best optimal to levy 
positive (negative) taxes on capital income (i.e. on future consumption). As the for labour 
income tax, eq. (38) applies both along the transition path and the steady state and shows that, 
in the first best (𝜆 = 0), the same argument applies as in the previous case: the government hits 
(or subsidizes) labour income only for corrective purposes (externality in the warm-glow,  
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
≠
0). However, in the second best (𝜆 > 0), things are different, in that a non-zero labour income 
tax may be optimal even in the case of absence of externality, and, as we will show in section 4, 
the sign of the optimal tax will depend, among other things, on the nature of labour supply (i.e. 
whether the latter is a normal of inferior good). We provide further comments on such findings 
in section 4. 
As for the Pigouvian tax on pollution X, by substituting for 𝑞𝑄  from (36) into (37) and 
exploiting (33) one gets: 
 
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
[
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑄
−
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
] +
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
𝐻
𝑢𝑄
𝑢𝑐
(1+𝜆∆𝑄)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
+
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
?̇?𝑄
𝑢𝑐(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
= −Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
)                (40) 
 
Next, exploiting (15) and (38’) the following relationship obtains: 
 
1
[1−𝜏𝑎]
=
𝜌−
𝑢𝑝(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
𝑢𝑐(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾−
?̇?𝑘
𝑞𝑘
𝜌−
?̇?
𝑞
                    (40’) 
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Plugging (40’) into (26), substituting into (40) for −Ψ′ and rearranging terms we can provide 
the following decomposition of 𝜏𝑥: 
 
𝜏𝑥 = 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 + 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) + 𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥 + 𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) + 𝜏𝐷
𝑥(𝑝)                  (41)  
 
with  
𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 =
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
𝐻
𝑢𝑄
𝑢𝑐
                    (41a) 
𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) =
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
(
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑄
−
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
)                 (41b) 
𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥 =
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
𝐻
𝑢𝑄
𝑢𝑐
𝜆
(∆𝑄−∆𝑐)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
                    (41c) 
𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) =
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜆
(∆𝑝−∆𝑐)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
(
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑄
−
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
−
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
)                (41d) 
𝜏𝐷
𝑥(𝑝) =
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
1
𝜌−
?̇?
𝑞
{[1 −
𝑢𝑝(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
𝑢𝑐(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
]
?̇?
𝑞
−
?̇?𝑘
𝑞𝑘
} +
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
?̇?𝑄
𝑢𝑐(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
             (41e) 
 
where 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 , 𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥  are the first-best and second-best tax components (i.e. when 𝜆 = 0 and 𝜆 > 0, 
respectively) in a framework without the warm-glow component (𝑢𝑝 = 0) and 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) + 𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) 
are the first-best and second-best components of the pollution tax that add to the previous ones 
in the presence of warm-glow. Notice that in the absence of public goods and externalities,  that 
is with Q not being present in the utility function and no externalities in H.1 (i.e. avoiding (S.2) 
or (S.3) specifications), the decentralised equilibrium would coincide with the planner’s 
solution (i.e. first welfare theorem applies), with stock prices incorporating both economic and 
social returns as in Baron (2007). 𝜏𝐷
𝑥(𝑝) is the dynamic component of the pollution tax that is 
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only present along the transitional path and is zero along the steady state. For the sake of clarity, 
in the reminder of the work we will focus on the steady state results13. 
As for the first best, without warm-glow (𝑢𝑝 = 0), X is an externality: there is no market for 
such a commodity, while it affects the public good consumed by individuals (Q), so that its 
marginal cost should be corrected by Pigouvian taxation (eq. 41a). On the other hand, in the 
presence of warm-glow (𝑢𝑝 < 0), X is a private good representing a (negative) contribution to 
a public good (Q) and is not an externality because it has a market (stock market). However, its 
market price is not optimal and should be corrected through the Samuelson’s rule (again 
eq.41a). More precisely, notice that in cases (S.1) and (S.3) the first-best add-on component due 
to the warm glow is zero (in that in 41b the terms  
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑄
=
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
= 0), while it is different from zero 
in case (S.2) and (S.4). In fact, in the latter cases, while X is still a private contribution to a public, 
there are also externalities at work: either the level of Q or F affect the marginal disutility of the 
warm-glow. The corrections for such externalities, in case (S.2), is operated through the add-
on term −
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
(
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
?̅?
𝑄
) > 0 , while in case (S.3) is operated through the add-on term 
(
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
)
2
(
?̅?
𝐹2
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
) > 0 and by hitting/subsidising both capital and labour income (see next section 
for further explanation of these findings and the sign of these corrective components). 
 Finally, equation (41d) is the second-best warm glow add-on component. Its sign is 
the sign of (∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐), and is related to whether consumption or warm glow is a stronger Hicks 
complement of leisure. Second-best tax theory produces uniform taxation of commodities 
which are equally strong Hicks complements to leisure. The good which has the stronger 
                                                        
13 It follows from (15), (27), (33)-(37) that when real quantities are constant, the individual co-states 𝑞𝑘, 𝑞𝑄 and 𝑞 
are also constant. We focus on steady state results though there may be occasions, for certain models, where a 
second-best economy does not converge to a steady state (see Straub and Werning 2018). 
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complementarity should be taxed at a higher rate (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1972). If (∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐) >
0 it means (in our model) that warm glow as a good has stronger complementarity with leisure 
than consumption c. This should imply that warm glow as a good should bear a higher tax than 
ordinary consumption. However, as we do not have a tax instrument on warm glow itself (and 
the consumption tax has been set to zero), the extra tax on pollution x (41d) plays the role of 
this missing instrument. Only when we have equal complementarity (∆𝑐 − ∆𝑝) = 0 , this 
component is redundant (as then c and p are taxed at the uniform rate 0). 
Table 1 summarizes our findings on 𝜏𝑥  (see Appendix A.4 for details) 
Table 1: Summary of the results on the pollution tax 𝝉𝒙 at the steady state 
 𝝉𝒙 
 No warm-glow (𝒖𝒑 =0) With warm-glow (𝒖𝒑 < 𝟎) 
First-Best 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥  𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 + 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) 
Second-Best 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 + 𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥  𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 + 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) + 𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥 + 𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝)  
 
4. Discussion of the results 
 In this section we analyse and comment on our obtained results on the optimal structure 
of taxes along the steady state. 
We first present the optimal tax structure at the first-best, and we focus on the second-best. 
We adopt a simplifying assumption on the shape of the utility function, on which we introduce 
the restriction of partial additivity. 
 
Assumption H2:  The instantaneous utility function assumes the following form: 
𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙, 𝑝, 𝑄) = 𝑣(𝑐, 𝑙) + ℎ(𝑝, 𝑄) 
i.e. additive and separable in (𝑐, 𝑙) and (𝑝, 𝑄). 
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We now provide the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma 1: Under H2, if leisure is non-inferior, then: 
L.1) ∆𝑙 − ∆𝑐> 0  
L.2) ∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐> 0 
L.3) (1 + 𝜆∆𝑝) > 0 
Proof. See Appendix A.2.           
 
Under the above assumptions, we can now provide the following Proposition 
characterizing the first-best tax structure. 
 
Proposition 1. At the steady state, the first-best tax structure is the following:  
a) 𝜏𝑥 > 0; 
b) 𝜏𝑎 , 𝜏𝑙 = 0 under specifications (S.1), (S.2) and (S.4),  
c) 𝜏𝑎 , 𝜏𝑙 < 0 under specification (S.3).   
 
Proof. The result on τx descends from eq. (41), whereby at the first-best 𝜏𝑥 = 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 + 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝), 
with 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 > 0  for all specifications of ?̅?𝑗(𝑡)  and 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) > 0  for specifications (S.2) and (S.3), 
(zero otherwise14). As for 𝜏𝑎, 𝜏𝑙 , the results descend from the fact that, at the first-best, 𝜆 = 0 
and, that, under specifications (S.1), (S.2) and (S.4), 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
= 0, so that the results sub b) of zero 
taxes follow from mere observation of (38) and (39). Under specification (S.3),  
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
< 0 ; 
moreover, recall that 𝑢𝑐 > 0, 𝑢𝑙 , 𝑢𝑝 < 0. Hence, by observation of (38) and (39), 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝜏
𝑎) =
                                                        
14 Note that under specification (S.4), 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
 appearing in the expression for 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) is zero. 
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𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝜏𝑙).  Finally, by (33),  (1 + 𝜆∆𝑐) > 0  and by Lemma 1, sub L.3), (1 + 𝜆∆𝑝) > 0 , so that 
𝜏𝑎 , 𝜏𝑙 < 0.             
 
Under formulation (S.1) and (S.4) there is no correction for warm-glow in the pollution tax 
(i.e. 𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) = 0)  and we get standard expression for corrective taxation, while the add-on 
correction is present under specifications (S.2) and (S.3) (see eq. 41b).  Furthermore, both taxes 
on capital and labour income are either zero or, in case the warm-glow depends on the scale of 
economic activity (S.3), negative (i.e. both inputs should be subsidized to reduce the individual’s 
perceived damage caused by firms). 
The economic rationale behind our findings it that, in formulation (S.2), while firms 
realise the consequence of pollution on its own perceived pollution content, they do not realise 
that they (in the aggregate) affect the state of the environment (environmental quality). If they 
did realise they affected the aggregate, they would have an incentive to lower pollution at each 
date to increase Q (again in order to lower the cost of capital). This needs to be corrected for in 
the first best, with an extra (positive) component added to the Pigou tax. 
As for formulation (S.3), the economic explanation for the result is that each firm realises 
that its individual pollution affects the perceived pollution content, but does not take into 
account the effect on aggregate production. If the firm could increase aggregate production, it 
would do so in order to reduce the perceived pollution content and lower the pollution 
premium (to lower the cost of capital). In the first best, this needs to be corrected for. Thus, 
capital and labour are subsidised to increase aggregate production. However, the correction to 
increase aggregate production, to lower the perceived pollution content, will imply that the 
abatement incentive for the firm is lowered. Therefore, the new Pigou tax needs to contain the 
extra (positive) component. 
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Let us now turn to the second-best tax structure, which we characterize through the 
following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. At the steady state, the second-best tax structure is the following:  
I) 𝜏𝑥 > 0; 
II) As for 𝜏𝑎: 
II.A) 𝜏𝑎 = 0 under specifications (S.1), (S.2) and (S.4),  
II.B) 𝜏𝑎 < 0 under specification (S.3).   
III) As for 𝜏𝑙: 
III.A) 𝜏𝑙 > 0 under specifications (S.1), (S.2) and (S.4),  
III.B) Its sign is ambiguous under specification (S.3). 
 
Proof. See Appendix A.3.           
 
As a final comment, we notice that the ambiguity of the sign of the labour income tax in 
specification (S.3) stems from the fact that the second-best component would make it 
optimal for the policymaker to levy positive taxes on labour income, while the first-best 
component does exert an opposite effect. We can summarize our results through the 
following Table (see Appendix A.4 for details). 
Table 2: Summary of the results on first-best and second best-tax structure 
 𝝉𝒙 𝝉𝒂 𝝉𝒍 
  Specifications 
(S.1), (S.2), (S.4) 
Specification 
(S.3) 
Specifications 
(S.1), (S.2), (S.4) 
Specification (S.3) 
First-Best 𝜏𝑥 > 0 
𝜏𝑎 = 0 𝜏𝑎 < 0 
𝜏𝑙 = 0 𝜏𝑙 < 0  
Second-Best 𝜏𝑥 > 0 𝜏𝑙 > 0 𝜏𝑙  ambiguous 
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5. The role of the warm-glow in the first-best allocation 
 In this section we provide an example to assess the role of the warm-glow in shaping the 
optimal tax structure in the first-best. To simplify, we assume the following utility function: 
 
𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙, 𝑝, 𝑄) = log (𝑐 −
𝑙1+𝜎
1+𝜎
) + log(𝑄) + 𝜉 ⋅ ℎ(𝑝)                                                                           (42) 
 
with ℎ′ < 0 and ℎ′′ < 0.  As for the warm-glow, we choose specification (S.1), i.e. ?̅?𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛾 ∙
𝑥𝑗(𝑡) and, as for technology, the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 𝐹 = 𝐾𝛽 ∙ 𝐿1−𝛽 , 
while capital depreciation, 𝛿, is assumed to be zero. We wish to assess how the corrective tax 
changes as warm-glow preferences become stronger, that is how 𝜏𝑥  varies with 𝜉. 
Recall that, in the first-best, under (S.1), both 𝜏𝑎  and 𝜏𝑙  are zero. By dividing (9) and (10) 
and exploiting (25), at the steady state we get:  
 
−
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐
= 𝑙𝜎 = 𝑤 = [1 − Ψ (
𝑋
𝐹
) + Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
)
𝑋
𝐹
] 𝐹𝐿                  (43) 
 
which, by defining  𝜃 ≡
𝑋
𝐹
, can be written as: 
 
𝐻 ∙ 𝑙1+𝜎 = 𝑤 = [1 − Ψ(𝜃) + Ψ′(𝜃) ∙ 𝜃] ∙ (1 − 𝛽) ∙ 𝐹                (44a) 
or 
𝐿 ≡ 𝐻 ∙ 𝑙 = 𝐻 ∙ [1 − Ψ(𝜃) + Ψ′(𝜃) ∙ 𝜃]
1
𝜎 ∙ (1 − 𝛽)
1
𝜎 ∙ (
𝐾
𝐿
)
1
𝜎
               (44b) 
 
Next, rewriting (27) as: 
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[1 − Ψ(𝜃) + Ψ′(𝜃) ∙ 𝜃] ⋅ 𝛽 ⋅ (
𝐿
𝐾
)
1−𝛽
= 𝜌 + 𝛿                   (45) 
 
By exploiting (44b), (45) and the production function we get and implicit equilibrium equation 
𝐹 = 𝐹(𝜃), and by log-differentiation of (44b), (45) and the production function we get: 
𝐹𝜃
𝐹
=
1 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝜎
(1 − 𝛽) ∙ 𝜎
⋅
Ψ′′(𝜃) ∙ 𝜃
[1 − Ψ(𝜃) + Ψ′(𝜃) ∙ 𝜃]
≥ 0. 
Taking (26) 
 
𝜏𝑥 = −Ψ′(𝜃) +
𝜉ℎ′(
𝛾
𝐻
∙𝑋)∙𝛾
𝑢𝑐
15                   (46) 
 
and recognizing that: 
 
 
1
𝑢𝑐
=
1
𝐻
∙ (𝐻 ∙ 𝑐 − 𝐻 ∙
𝑙1+𝜎
1+𝜎
)                   (47) 
 
and exploiting (29) at steady state: 
 
𝑐 ∙ 𝐻 = [1 − Ψ(θ)] ∙ 𝐹(θ) − 𝐺                   (48) 
 
to substitute for 𝑐 ∙ 𝐻 into (47) and (46), we get: 
 
                                                        
15 Notice that, under specification (S.1), the equilibrium value of the warm-glow function is 𝑝 = ∑
?̅?𝑗
𝐻
= 𝛾 ∙
𝑋
𝐻
𝐽
𝑗=1 , 
with 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
= 𝛾. 
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𝜏𝑥 = −Ψ′(𝜃) + 𝜉 ∙ ℎ′ (
𝛾
𝐻
∙ 𝜃 ∙ 𝐹(𝜃)) ∙
𝛾
𝐻
∙ [(1 − Ψ) ∙ 𝐹(𝜃) − 𝐺 −
1−𝛽
1+𝜎
∙ (1 − Ψ(𝜃) + Ψ′(𝜃) ∙ 𝜃) ∙ 𝐹(θ)]
                       (49) 
Moreover, by substituting for Q from (30), evaluated at the steady state, into (41a) and 
exploiting (47) and (29), yields: 
 
𝜏𝑥 =
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
∙ 𝐻 ∙ 𝑀(𝜃, 𝐹(𝜃))                   (50) 
 
with 𝑀(𝜃, 𝐹(𝜃)) ≡  
𝑢𝑄
𝑢𝑐
= 𝜇 ∙
1−Ψ(𝜃)−
𝐺
𝐹(θ)
−
1−𝛽
1+𝜎
∙[1−Ψ(𝜃)+Ψ′(𝜃)∙𝜃]
𝜙
𝐹(θ)
−𝜂⋅𝜃
> 0. 
 
Equations (49) and (50) provide the two equilibrium conditions for first-best optimal 
allocations of 𝜃 and 𝜏𝑥 . In order to evaluate the effect of the warm-glow on the steady state, we 
apply Cramer’s rule to get the partial derivatives of 𝜃 and 𝜏𝑥  with respect to the parameter 𝜉. 
Total differentiation of (49) and (50) yields: 
 
𝑑𝜏𝑥 = −(Ψ′′ + 𝜉 ∙ 𝑚) ∙ 𝑑𝜃 +
ℎ′(𝑝)
𝑢𝑐
∙ 𝑑𝜉                  (51) 
𝑑𝜏𝑥 =
𝜂
𝜌+𝜇
∙ 𝐻 ∙ 𝑀𝜃 ∙ 𝑑𝜃                     (52) 
 
with 
𝑚 ≡ −𝜉ℎ′′(𝑝) (
𝛾
𝐻
)
2
(𝐹 + 𝜃𝐹𝜃) [(1 − Ψ)𝐹 − 𝐺 −
1 − 𝛽
1 + 𝜎
(1 − Ψ + Ψ′𝜃)𝐹]
+ 𝜉ℎ′(𝑝)
𝛾
𝐻
[1 − Ψ −
1 − 𝛽
1 + 𝜎
∙ (1 − Ψ + Ψ′𝜃)𝐹𝜃 − Ψ
′𝐹 − Ψ′′𝐹𝜃
1 − 𝛽
1 + 𝜎
] 
                        (53) 
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𝑀𝜃 = 𝜇
[−Ψ′ +
𝐺
𝐹
𝐹𝜃
𝐹 −
1 − 𝛽
1 + 𝜎 Ψ
′′𝜃] (
𝜙
𝐹 − 𝜂𝜃) + [1 − Ψ −
𝐺
𝐹 −
1 − 𝛽
1 + 𝜎
(1 − Ψ + Ψ′𝜃)] (
𝜙
𝐹
𝐹𝜃
𝐹 − 𝜂)
[
𝜙
𝐹 − 𝜂𝜃]
2  
                        (54) 
Sufficient for  𝑚 > 0  and 𝑀𝜃 > 0  is −Ψ
′−Ψ′′𝜃 ≥ 0  (which we will assume throughout the 
example16). From (51) and (52) we get: 
 
𝑑𝜏𝑥
𝑑𝜉
=
ℎ′(𝑝)
𝑢𝑐 [1 + (Ψ′′ + 𝜉 ∙ 𝑚) ∙
1
𝜂
𝜌 + 𝜇 ∙ 𝐻 ∙ 𝑀𝜃
]
< 0 
and 
𝑑𝜃
𝑑𝜉
=
ℎ′(𝑝)
𝑢𝑐 [
𝜂
𝜌 + 𝜇 ∙ 𝐻 ∙ 𝑀𝜃 +
(Ψ′′ + 𝜉 ∙ 𝑚)]
< 0 
 
Hence, we have shown that stronger warm-glow preferences reduce the level of the optimal 
pollution tax and the pollution intensity. Moreover, given that 𝐹𝜃 > 0 , stronger warm-glow 
preferences reduce total production and the level of capital. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we characterize optimal taxes in a continuous-time model in the presence of 
pollution as a joint product of production. We explicitly allow investors to engage in socially 
responsible investments through a warm-glow mechanism as in Andreoni (1990) and Dam 
(2011) and firms to engage in corporate socially responsible activities through pollution 
abatement activity. 
                                                        
16 it is possible to show that the latter inequality holds under a CES abatement function with low elasticity of 
substitution. 
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We show that the first-best tax structure consists in positive taxation of pollution and either 
zero or negative taxation of production-factor incomes (negative taxation arising in case the 
perceived pollution content of firms is negatively related to the total scale of economic activity). 
As for the second-best structure, we show that the pollution tax has an additivity property, 
consisting of the first-best component, plus the first best-warm-glow component, plus a second-
best component, plus the second-best warm-glow component. Leisure being non-inferior is 
sufficient for the add-on components to be positive or zero, apart from the second-best warm-
glow component, which can take on any sign. Overall, in the second-best the total pollution tax 
is positive, suggesting that warm-glow is not a substitute for the government. 
While the first-best tax rule for the capital income tax also holds in the second-best, it 
emerges that in general, sufficient for the labour income tax to be positive is that leisure is non 
inferior (though its sign can be ambiguous, if the perceived pollution content of the firm 
depends on gross GDP). Finally, in an example we show that the presence of warm-glow 
preferences yields lower first-best pollution taxes. 
Finally, we have focused on an identical household economy, where an individual specific 
lump-sum tax is unavailable (the Ramsey tradition). We do this to keep the analysis as simple 
as possible, given that the model is already complex, and it is the first paper dealing with 
optimal taxation in a dynamic general equilibrium model, in the presence of environmental 
warm-glow, firms’ abatement activities and financial markets. we leave the second-best 
optimal-tax case with heterogeneous households for future research. 
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Appendix A.1. The implementability constraint 
Time derivative of 𝑞(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡) is 
 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
[𝑞(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡)] = ?̇?(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡) + 𝑞(𝑡)?̇?(𝑡)        (A.1.1) 
 
Exploiting (6) and (15), (A.1.1) reads as: 
 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
[𝑞(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡)] = 𝑞(𝑡){?̅?(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡) − 𝑐(𝑡) − 𝑧(𝑡)} − 𝑢𝑝(𝑡) ∑
𝜔𝑗(𝑡)?̅?𝑗(𝑡)
𝑉𝑗(𝑡)
𝑎(𝑡)𝐽𝑗=1 + 𝑎(𝑡)𝜌𝑞(𝑡) (A.1.2) 
 
By substituting for 𝑞(𝑡) from (9) and (10) and exploiting (4) it follows: 
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𝑑
𝑑𝑡
[𝑞(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡)] − 𝜌𝑞(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡) = −𝑢𝑝(𝑡)𝑝(𝑡) − 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑐(𝑡) − 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑧(𝑡) − 𝑢𝑙(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡) (A.1.3) 
 
Multiplying both sides by 𝑒−𝜌𝑡 (A.1.3) can be written as: 
 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
[𝑞(𝑡)𝑎(𝑡)𝑒−𝜌𝑡] = −𝑒−𝜌𝑡[𝑢𝑝(𝑡)𝑝(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑐(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑧(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑙(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡)] (A.1.4) 
 
and integrating it follows that: 
 
 𝑎(0)𝑞(0) = ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡[𝑢𝑝(𝑡)𝑝(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑙(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑐(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑐(𝑡)𝑧(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡
∞
0
  (A.1.5) 
 
which is eq. (28) in the text.  
 
Appendix A.2. Proof of Lemma 1 
𝑞 is the marginal shadow value of assets and is inversely related to assets. We take as normality 
of, say 𝑐, the case when 
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑞
< 0, as it corresponds to 
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑎
> 0, the “income effect” keeping prices 
fixed. Normality of leisure is when labour increases in 𝑞, that is 
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝑞
> 0. 
Differentiating (9) and (10) for partially separable utility (assumption H2) we have: 
[
𝑢𝑐𝑐 𝑢𝑐𝑙
𝑢𝑙𝑐 𝑢𝑙𝑙
] [
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝑞
] = [
1
−?̅?
] = [
1
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐
]         (A.2.1) 
Cramer’s rule provides the following: 
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝑞
=
1
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
−
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑙𝑐
         (A.2.2) 
Concavity of 𝑢 implies 
𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑙 − 𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑙𝑐 > 0         (A.2.3) 
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Then, since 𝑢𝑙 < 0, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝑞
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (−
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
+
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
), that is, leisure is non-inferior if −
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
+
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
≥ 0. 
From definition of ∆𝑐 and ∆𝑙 
∆𝑐 − ∆𝑙= (
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
−
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
) 𝑐 + (
𝑢𝑙𝑙
𝑢𝑙
−
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑐
) 𝑙.        (A.2.4) 
From eq. (6) in steady state 
𝑐 = ?̅?𝑙 + ?̅?𝑎 = −
𝑢𝑙𝑙
𝑢𝑐
+ ?̅?𝑎         (A.2.5) 
where ?̅? is after-tax return on assets. Substituting (A.2.5) into (A.2.4) and rearranging we 
have: 
 
∆𝑐 − ∆𝑙=
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐
2 𝑙 [𝑢𝑐𝑐 − 2
𝑢𝑐
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑙𝑐 + (
𝑢𝑐
𝑢𝑙
)
2
] + (
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
−
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
) ?̅?𝑎 .     (A.2.6) 
 
The term in squared brackets is a quadratic form of the Hessian of 𝑢 and is negative under 
concavity. Since 𝑢𝑙 < 0, we have ∆𝑐 − ∆𝑙> 0 if −
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
+
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
≥ 0, i.e. if leisure is non-inferior. 
From definition of ∆𝑝 and ∆𝑐,  
∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐=
𝑢𝑝𝑝
𝑢𝑝
𝑝 −
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
𝑐 −
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
𝑙.         (A.2.7) 
Using (A.2.5), (A.2.7) can be written as 
∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐=
𝑢𝑝𝑝
𝑢𝑝
𝑝 +
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐
(
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
−
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
) 𝑙 −
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
?̅?𝑎 .       (A.2.8) 
Then, −
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
+
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
≥ 0 ⇒ ∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐> 0, since 
𝑢𝑝𝑝
𝑢𝑝
𝑝 > 0. 
Next, from definition of ∆𝑄 and using the steps above, we have 
∆𝑄 − ∆𝑐=
𝑢𝑝𝑄
𝑢𝑄
𝑝 − 1 +
𝑢𝑙
𝑢𝑐
(
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
−
𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑢𝑙
) 𝑙 −
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
?̅?𝑎 .      (A.2.9) 
Non-inferiority of leisure implies ∆𝑄 − ∆𝑐>
𝑢𝑝𝑄
𝑢𝑄
𝑝 − 1. 
 38 
If complete additive separability, ∆𝑄= 0, then from the definition of ∆𝑐 we have ∆𝑄 − ∆𝑐=
−
𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝑢𝑐
𝑐 − 1. 
Finally, from (33) (1 + 𝜆∆𝑐) > 0 , next (1 + 𝜆∆𝑐) = (1 + 𝜆∆𝑝) − 𝜆(∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐).  So, ∆𝑝 −
∆𝑐> 0 implies (1 + 𝜆∆𝑝) > 0. 
 
Appendix A.3. Proof of Proposition 2  
Proof: As for the sign of 𝜏𝑥 , by using (15), in steady state we get 
𝑟 =
𝜌
[1−𝜏𝑎]
.          (A.3.1) 
equating (A.3.1) and (27), at the symmetric equilibrium we obtain: 
 
[1 − Ψ (
𝑋
𝐹
) + Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
)
𝑋
𝐹
] 𝐹𝐾 − 𝛿 =
𝜌
[1−𝜏𝑎]
.        (A.3.2) 
 
From (35), in steady state we can write: 
 
𝜌 =
𝑢𝑝
𝑞𝑘
(1 + 𝜆∆𝑝)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾 + {[1 − Ψ (
𝑋
𝐹
) + Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
)
𝑋
𝐹
] 𝐹𝐾 − 𝛿}     (A.3.3) 
Substituting from eq. (A.3.2), (A.3.3) can be written as: 
 
𝜌 =
𝑢𝑝
𝑞𝑘
(1 + 𝜆∆𝑝)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾 +
𝜌
[1−𝜏𝑎]
.          (A.3.4) 
and, exploiting (33) 
 
1
[1−𝜏𝑎]
= 1 −
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
         (A.3.5) 
 
Substituting for the LHS of (A.3.5) into (26) provides: 
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𝜏𝑥 =
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
[1 −
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
] − Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
)      (A.3.6) 
 
Exploiting (36) to substitute for Ψ′ (
𝑋
𝐹
) into (A.3.6) we obtain:  
 
𝜏𝑥 =
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
−
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
−
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
+ 𝜂
𝑞𝑄
𝑞𝑘
    (A.3.7) 
 
Collecting terms of (A.3.7) it descends: 
 
𝜏𝑥 =
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
[𝜆
(∆𝑐−∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
−
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
] + 𝜂
𝑞𝑄
𝑞𝑘
      (A.3.8) 
 
By our assumptions and by Lemma 1, 
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑋
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
[𝜆
(∆𝑐−∆𝑝)
(1+𝜆∆𝑝)
−
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
] > 0.  
Finally, given that 𝑞𝑘 > 0 and that 𝑞𝑄 > 0 (from eq. (30) and increase of 𝜙 relaxes the 
environmental constraint, so that 
𝜕Λ
𝜕𝜙
= 𝑞𝑄 > 0), it follows that 𝜏𝑥(𝑡) > 0. 
As for 𝜏𝑎 , the argument presented in Proposition 1 applies. Finally, as for 𝜏𝑙 , under 
specifications (S.1), (S.2) and (S.4), the term 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
 in eq. (38) is zero, while (∆𝑙 − ∆𝑐) > 0 by 
Lemma 1, sub L.1), so that 𝜏𝑙 > 0. Under specification (S.3), 
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝐹
< 0, so that the sign of 𝜏𝑙  is 
ambiguous.             
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Appendix A.4 
Detailed summary of the results on first-best and second best-tax structure at the 
steady state 
  
S.1 
(?̅? = 𝛾 ∙ 𝑋) 
S.2 
(?̅? = 𝛾 ∙
𝑋
𝑄
) 
S.4 
(?̅? = 𝛾) 
S.3 
(?̅? = 𝛾 ∙
𝑋
𝐹
) 
 
𝝉𝒍
𝟏 − 𝝉𝒍
 
First Best 
(𝜆 = 0) 
0 −
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑙
?̅?
𝐹
𝐹𝐿 < 0 
Second best 
add-on 
component 
𝜆
(∆𝑙 − ∆𝑐)
(1 + 𝜆∆𝑐)
> 0 𝜆
(∆𝑙−∆𝑐)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
−
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑙
𝜆
(∆𝑝−∆𝑐)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
?̅?
𝐹
𝐹𝐿 > 0  
 𝜏𝑙 is zero at first best and positive at second best 
𝜏𝑙 is negative at first best and 
ambiguous at second best 
 
𝝉𝒂 
First Best 
(𝜆 = 0) 
0 
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
?̅?
𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝑟
< 0 
Second best 
add-on 
component 
0 
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
𝜆
(∆𝑝−∆𝑐)
(1+𝜆∆𝑐)
?̅?
𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝑟
< 0  
 𝜏𝑎 is zero both at first and second best 
𝜏𝑎 is negative both at first and second 
best 
 
𝝉𝒙 
First best 
without 
warm glow: 
𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥   
(𝜆 = 0) 
𝜂
𝜌 + 𝜇
𝐻
𝑢𝑄
𝑢𝑐
> 0 
First best 
add-on 
component 
with warm-
glow: 
𝜏𝐹𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) 
(𝜆 = 0) 
0 −
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
(
𝜂
𝜌 + 𝜇
?̅?
𝑄
) > 0 0 (
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
)
2
(
?̅?
𝐹2
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
) > 0 
Second best 
add-on 
component 
without 
warm-glow 
𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥  
𝜂
𝜌 + 𝜇
𝐻
𝑢𝑄
𝑢𝑐
𝜆
(∆𝑄 − ∆𝑐)
(1 + 𝜆∆𝑐)
> 0 
Second best 
add-on 
component 
with warm-
glow𝜏𝑆𝐵
𝑥 (𝑝) 
−
𝑢𝑝𝜆
𝑢𝑐
?̅?
𝑋
(∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐)
(1 + 𝜆∆𝑐)
> 0 −
𝑢𝑝𝜆
𝑢𝑐
(∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐)
(1 + 𝜆∆𝑐)
?̅?
𝑄
(
𝜂
𝜌 + 𝜇
+
𝑄
𝑋
) > 0 0 −
𝑢𝑝𝜆
𝑢𝑐
(∆𝑝 − ∆𝑐)
(1 + 𝜆∆𝑐)
?̅?
𝑋
(1 −
𝑢𝑝
𝑢𝑐
?̅?
𝐹
𝐹𝐾
𝜌
) > 0 
 𝜏𝑥 is positive both at first and second best 
 
